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1. Introduction
Fiscal stimulus packages implemented throughout the world in response to the last recession
have renewed the academic interest in the general equilibrium effects of fiscal policy, espe-
cially changes in government spending. Empirically, the difficulty in measuring such effects
is to identify exogenous policy shocks, since observed movements in fiscal variables may as
well reflect automatic responses to economic conditions or financing constraints. Historically,
standard practice has been to put this difficulty aside by assuming that government spending
is predetermined with respect the state of the economy and follows an exogenous stochastic
process. This assumption underlies many empirical works on spending multipliers, both using
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models (Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland,
2010; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011) or structural vector autoregressions (SVARs;
Fata´s and Mihov, 2001; Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s, 2007).
A strand of papers calls into question the validity of this approach by emphasizing the
presence of endogenous movements in government spending. For instance, estimating real-
business-cycle models, McGrattan (1994) and Jones (2002) both report positive responses of
public expenditures to, respectively, contemporaneous productivity shocks and contemporane-
ous output. Instead, Fe`ve, Matheron, and Sahuc (2013) obtain the opposite result that govern-
ment spending is countercyclical in the U.S. While contradictory, these findings hint that the
exogeneity assumption is not supported by the data. Additionally, Leeper, Plante, and Traum
(2010) find a significant feedback from the level of public debt to spending, a mechanism ab-
sent from papers adopting a Ricardian framework. Eventually, endogenous links are uncovered
using simple regressions by Clemens and Miran (2012), who argue that balanced-budget rules
induce substantial procyclicality in state government spending in the U.S.
In this context, the objectives of this paper are twofold. First, I provide new estimates
of endogenous movements in government consumption in the postwar U.S. economy using
a New-Keynesian DSGE model in the spirit of Smets and Wouters (2007). I augment the
baseline structure by a richer description of the fiscal sector, including explicit debt financ-
ing as in Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010), distortionary taxation as in Uhlig (2010) and
Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011), and feedback policy rules allowing fiscal instruments to respond
to contemporaneous output and to the lagged level of debt. The model’s strong propagation
mechanisms are important for valid estimation of policy rules coefficients, since a flex-price
economy with weak internal channels would attribute to feedback effects much of the unex-
plained comovements between, say, output and government consumption. I estimate the model
using quarterly U.S. data from 1960 to 2007 with Bayesian methods, considering the behavior
of a general government sector aggregating federal and state government accounts. Second, I
use the estimated model as laboratory to test output multipliers derived from three standard
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econometric approaches: two that abstract from potential endogeneity—a DSGE model with
exogenous government spending and a VAR identified by exogeneity restrictions—and one that
tries to control for it—a VAR identified by Mountford and Uhlig’s (2009) sign restrictions.1
Two results stand out. First, I find significant statistical evidence in favor of government
consumption endogeneity over the 1960-2007 sample, with a significant response of spending to
both the debt-to-output ratio and contemporaneous output. Digging deeper, I uncover some
subsample instability in the endogeneity patterns, with a fall in the individual elasticities of
government consumption to debt and output over time. Second, I show that omitting to control
for endogeneity induces an upward bias in estimated output multipliers, especially so when the
policy shock is identified using SVARs. Monte Carlo experiments suggest that the estimation
error may be sizable, with output multipliers sometimes overestimated by a factor 2, and may
be present even for a DGP featuring only moderate feedback effects. Interestingly, of the three
identification approaches under test, sign restrictions have the worst performance in spite of
being especially designed to handle policy endogeneity.
The paper contributes to a rising literature trying to understand the determinants of fiscal
policy and their implications for the identification of fiscal multipliers. While existing DSGE
models with fiscal policy rules either consider flex-price economies, abstract from debt financ-
ing, or consider only the behavior of the federal U.S. government, the model estimated here
features nominal frictions that have proved important to match the data, specifies rich fiscal
policy rules, and considers the behavior of the general government sector to provide a com-
prehensive picture of the forces shaping government consumption in the U.S. Focusing on the
general government sector seems especially important, both because empirical work on mul-
tipliers typically considers aggregate public spending as a whole and because of Clemens and
Miran’s (2012) finding that local government spending has a strong endogenous component.
The paper is also the first to quantify the effects of fiscal endogeneity on the outcomes of leading
identification approaches. By doing so, it complements Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohe´, and Uribe
(2012) who evaluate the ability of VARs to propagate the effects of fiscal shocks but abstract
from identification issues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the DSGE model and
discusses the specification of fiscal rules. Section 3 describes the estimation procedure and
the data. It also reports estimation results and evaluates the strength of endogenous feedback
effects on government consumption in different subsamples. Eventually, section 4 uses the
1I do not test two alternative empirical strategies: Ramey’s (2011) correction for anticipated shocks and
Bouakez, Chihi, and Normandin’s (2014) use of conditional heteroscedasticity. Both would require nontrivial
changes in the specification and the estimation of the DSGE model, namely the inclusion of news shocks and of
time-varying volatility. I leave exploration of these for future work.
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DSGE model to test the performance of alternative identification techniques in presence of
spending endogeneity. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
I use a New-Keynesian model with a focus on fiscal policy, similar to the one laid out in
Traum and Yang (2011). Compared to most empirical monetary models, its specificity lies in
the interplay of public debt, distortionary taxation, and endogenous fiscal policy rules with
the government budget constraint. Such features allow for a rich description of fiscal policy,
enhancing the model’s ability to fit the data and to identify the dynamic effects of fiscal shocks.
2.1. Firms. The economy produces a single final good used for consumption, investment, and
government spending, and a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by f ∈ [0, 1] . The final-
good sector is perfectly competitive, while there is monopolistic competition in the markets for
intermediates.
2.1.1. Final-good firms. The final good is produced by combining intermediate goods according
to
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(f)
1
1+η
p
t df
)1+ηpt
,
where Yt(f) is the quantity of intermediate good f used in final-good production and η
p
t is a
shock to the good market markup evolving according to a stationary process:
ln
ηpt
ηp
= ρp ln
ηpt−1
ηp
+ pt , with 
p
t ∼ iidN(0, σ2p) and ηp > 0.
Letting Pt(f) denote the price of intermediate good f and Pt the associated price index, cost
minimization implies a demand structure of the form
Yt(f) =
(
Pt(f)
Pt
)− 1+ηpt
η
p
t
Yt, with Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(f)
− 1
η
p
t df
)−ηpt
.
Perfect competition in the final sector implies that Pt is also the price of the final good.
2.1.2. Intermediate-good firms. Each intermediate good f is produced by a monopolist accord-
ing to
Yt(f) = u
a
t [vtKt−1(f)]
αLt(f)
1−α,
where vtKt−1(f) denotes effective capital input taking utilization vt into account, Lt(f) denotes
labor input, and α ∈ [0, 1] is the capital share. There is no fixed cost of production and uat is
a productivity shock evolving according to a stationary process:
lnuat = ρa lnu
a
t−1 + 
a
t , with 
a
t ∼ iidN(0, σ2a).
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The static cost-minimization problem implies that all producers have the same nominal mar-
ginal cost
MCt =
1
uat
(
Wt
1− α
)1−α(Rkt
α
)α
,
where Wt and R
k
t denote the nominal wage and rental rate of capital.
Intermediate firms face Calvo (1983) frictions in nominal price setting. Each period, an
intermediate firm can reoptimize its price with probability 1 − ξp. Those that cannot do so
index their prices to lagged inflation according to
Pt(f) = pi
ιp
t−1Pt−1(f),
where pit = Pt/Pt−1. A firm that is able to reoptimize at date t solves
max
P
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βξp)
sΛt+s(1− τt+s)
[(
Pt+s−1
Pt−1
)ιp
P −MCt+S
] [(
Pt+s−1
Pt−1
)ιp P
Pt+s
]− 1+ηpt+s
η
p
t+s
Yt+s,
where Λt is the household’s stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs and τt the marginal
tax rate on profits. Letting P ?t denote the solution to this maximization program, the aggregate
price index evolves according to
pit =
[
(1− ξp)pi
− 1
η
p
t
t
(
P ?t
Pt
)− 1
η
p
t
+ ξppi
− ιp
η
p
t
t−1
]−ηpt
.
2.2. Labor market. A perfectly competitive labor packer purchases differentiated labor ser-
vices supplied by households and transforms them into a composite labor input Lt usable by
firms:
Lt =
(∫ 1
0
Lt(l)
1
1+ηwt dl
)1+ηwt
,
where Lt(l) denotes labor service of type l and η
w
t is a shock to the labor market markup
evolving according to a stationary process:
ln
ηwt
ηw
= ρw ln
ηwt−1
ηw
+ wt , with 
w
t ∼ iidN(0, σ2w) and ηw > 0.
Cost minimization implies a demand structure of the form
Lt(l) =
(
Wt(l)
Wt
)− 1+ηwt
ηwt
Lt,
where Wt(l) is the nominal wage rate for type-l labor. The aggregate nominal wage index is
then given by
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(l)
− 1
ηwt dl
)−ηwt
.
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2.3. Households. There is a measure one of households in the economy. The representative
household’s lifetime utility function writes
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log (Ct −Ht)− 1
1 + κ
∫ 1
0
Lt(l)
1+κdl
)
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and κ ≥ 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. Ct denotes private consumption, Ht is an external stock of habits that is
proportional to the lagged consumption basket:
Ht = hCt−1, with h ∈ [0, 1),
and Lt(l) stands for type-l hours worked.
The literature has considered specific mechanisms to help DSGE models generate output
multipliers larger than one by boosting private consumption after positive government spending
shocks. For instance, Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007) introduce rule-of-thumbs households
and Fe`ve, Matheron, and Sahuc (2013) allow for Edgeworth complementarity between private
and public consumption. I have tested the empirical relevance of both mechanisms using my
estimated model and found them too weak to generate a rise in consumption after a government
spending shock. I have thus removed them for simplicity.
The representative household’s flow real budget constraint writes
Ct + It +
Bt
ubt
+ Ψ(vt)Kt−1 =
Rt−1Bt−1
pit
+ (1− τt)
(∫ 1
0
Wt(l)
Pt
Lt(l)dl + r
k
t vtKt−1 +Dt
)
+ Zt.
On the expenditure side, It is investment, Bt is real holdings of riskless one-period government
bonds, and Ψ(vt)Kt−1 is the cost of capital utilization. In the steady state, vt = 1 and the
function Ψ is such that Ψ(1) = 0. I introduce a parameter ψ ∈ [0, 1) such that Ψ′′(1)/Ψ′(1) =
ψ/(1−ψ). Also, ubt is an exogenous risk premium shock reflecting unmodeled financial frictions.
It evolves according to a stationary process:
lnubt = ρb lnu
b
t−1 + 
b
t , with 
b
t ∼ iidN(0, σ2b ).
On the revenue side, Rt−1Bt−1/pit is real income from bond holdings, Wt(l)Lt(l)/Pt is gross
real labor income from type-l labor, rkt vtKt−1 is gross real capital income, Dt are dividends,
and Zt is a lump-sum transfer from the government. As in Traum and Yang (2011), I assume
that a single income tax rate τt applies to both labor and capital income.
2
Physical capital evolves according to
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + uit
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
It,
2Allowing for a richer array of tax rates would require augmenting the model with several parameters and the
inclusion of additional observables. For the purpose of characterizing tax dynamics after a government spending
shock, all rates would follow similar patterns given their common financing role (Leeper, Plante, and Traum,
2010).
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where S(.) is an adjustment cost function verifying S(1) = S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) = s, and uit is
a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment evolving according to a stationary process:
lnuit = ρi lnu
i
t−1 + 
i
t, with 
i
t ∼ iidN(0, σ2i ).
2.3.1. Wage setting. Households face Calvo (1983) frictions in nominal wage setting. Each
period, they can reoptimize the nominal wage for type-l labor service with probability 1− ξw.
Wages that are not reoptimized are indexed to lagged inflation, according to
Wt(l) = pi
ιw
t−1Wt−1(l).
When reoptimizing the wage for type-l labor, households solve
max
W
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βξw)
s
(
−Lt+s(l)
1+κ
1 + κ
)
,
subject to the demand function for type-l labor, the real budget constraint, and the indexation
equation for nominal wages. Letting W ?t denote the solution to this maximization program
and w?t = W
?
t /Pt its real counterpart, the aggregate real wage index then evolves according to
wt =
(
(1− ξw)(w?t )
− 1
ηwt + ξwpi
− ιw
ηwt
t−1 pi
1
ηwt
t w
− 1
ηwt
t−1
)−ηwt
.
2.4. Public policy. The monetary authority implements a Taylor-type rule, in which the
nominal gross interest rate depends on its lagged value and responds to current inflation and
output. Specifically, the monetary rule writes
ln
Rt
R
= ρr ln
Rt−1
R
+ (1− ρr)
(
ηpi ln
pit
pi
+ ηy ln
Yt
Y
)
+ lnumt .
Variables without time subscript denote steady-state levels, while umt is a disturbance capturing
the discretionary component of monetary policy, modeled as a persistent stationary process:
lnumt = ρm lnu
m
t−1 + 
m
t , with 
m
t ∼ iidN(0, σ2m).
Each period, the government collects tax revenues and issues one-period nominal riskless
bonds PtBt to finance its expenditures Gt and Zt, where Gt represents public consumption.
The real government flow budget constraint is thus
Bt + τt
(
wtLt + r
k
t vtKt−1 +Dt
)
=
Rt−1Bt−1
pit
+Gt + Zt.
I follow Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010) and Coenen, Straub, and Trabandt (2012) in
assuming simple policy rules for the three fiscal instruments τt, Gt, and Zt. Each fiscal rule
combines four components: an autoregressive term capturing the own persistence of the vari-
able, a response to the lagged debt-to-output ratio reflecting a debt-stabilization motive, a
response to the contemporaneous level of activity capturing either automatic stabilization or
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the effects of loosening the government’s budget constraint, and a Gaussian innovation captur-
ing the discretionary component of policy. Letting st = Bt/Yt denote the real debt-to-output
ratio, the fiscal rules thus write
τ̂t = ρτ τ̂t−1 + (1− ρτ )(γτ ŝt−1 + κτ Ŷt) + τt ,
Ĝt = ρgĜt−1 + (1− ρg)(γg ŝt−1 + κgŶt) + gt ,
Ẑt = ρzẐt−1 + (1− ρz)(γz ŝt−1 + κzŶt) + zt .
2.4.1. Remarks on the policy rules. The above monetary and fiscal rules assume that all policy
instruments react to the log deviation between output and its steady state. In contrast, the
literature suggests that targeting the output gap (the log deviation between output and its
flex-price counterpart) is optimal for both monetary and fiscal authorities (Woodford, 2003;
Benigno and Woodford, 2004; Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2006).
Four considerations underlie my modeling choice. First, I use the policy rules as simple
statistical representations of the behavior of public authorities, without claiming that they
reflect economic optimality. Second, I consider that estimated policy rules are more robust when
based on observable variables such as output, rather than on unobservable, model-dependent
variables such as the output gap. Third, my specification of policy rules follows preexisting
empirical work, allowing for simple comparisons. Fourth, I show in Appendix A that estimation
outcomes are reasonably robust to the specification of policy rules and that my baseline choice
is associated with the lowest degree of government consumption endogeneity, thereby ensuring
that the paper’s results are conservative with respect to the design of monetary and fiscal rules.
2.5. Market clearing and solution method. Good market clearing requires that
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + Ψ(vt)Kt−1.
A detailed derivation of the model equilibrium and of the numerical solution method is
provided in a technical appendix available upon request. I compute a log-linear approximation
to the equilibrium dynamics around the deterministic steady state of the model and use Klein’s
(2000) approach to solve the resulting rational expectation system.
3. Estimation Results
I estimate the model using Bayesian methods (An and Schorfheide, 2007) and quarterly U.S.
series. Because the artificial economy features nine forcing processes, I include nine observables:
real consumption, real investment, real government spending, real transfers, real tax revenue,
the real wage, hours worked, the nominal interest rate, and the inflation rate. I define govern-
ment spending as government consumption, to avoid confounding its properties and economic
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effects with those of government investment. To preserve the coherence of national accounts,
I incorporate public investment into the investment series used in estimation and account for
it as a transfer from the government to households. This last choice ensures that the model-
based debt variable matches its empirical counterpart. Appendix B provides all data sources
and describes the linkage to observables.
I remove a linear trend from the logarithms of consumption, investment, government spend-
ing, transfers, tax revenue, and the real wage and use the detrended series for estimation. As
noted by Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010), this approach is a simple way to deal with the own
trends of fiscal variables, which would otherwise complicate the specification of the model to
ensure sustainability.3 Also, a useful by-product is that I will not need to worry about the trend
specification when using the estimated DSGE model to test alternative identification approach
in section 4. More importantly, and unlike recent papers focusing on the federal government
(Leeper, Plante, and Traum, 2010; Traum and Yang, 2010, 2011), I consider the behavior of an
aggregate public sector that also incorporates state and local governments. The rationale be-
hind this choice is the objective of comparability with the empirical literature, where aggregate
spending of all governments is typically used.
I consider three estimation samples: 1960Q1-2007Q4, 1960Q1-1978Q4, and 1983Q1-2007Q4.
I exclude the 1950s because of the presence of exceptional fiscal shocks caused by the Korean
war and I stop the sample in 2007Q4 to avoid nonlinearities due to the binding zero lower bound
on the nominal interest rate afterward. I also consider a split sample because several papers,
for instance Perotti (2004) and Bouakez, Chihi, and Normandin (2014), document important
differences in the U.S. economy’s response to fiscal shocks before and after 1979 using SVARs.
Allowing for a break should also help avoiding indeterminacy issues due to changing monetary-
fiscal policy interactions (Bhattarai, Lee, and Park, 2012). I break the sample according to Gal´ı,
Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2003): the first subsample corresponds to the high inflation period
ending with the appointment of Paul Volcker at the Federal Reserve; the second encompasses
the so-called ‘Great Moderation’; and the 1979Q1-1982Q4 period is excluded on the grounds
of its specificity in terms of monetary policy.
3.1. Prior distributions and calibrated parameters. As usual, I calibrate some parame-
ters that are difficult to identify from the data. Specifically, I set the discount factor β to 0.99,
the depreciation rate δ to 0.025, the capital elasticity of output α to 0.34, and the steady-state
markups in the good and labor markets ηp and ηw to 0.10, all standard values. Steady-state
gross inflation is normalized to 1. I use averages from the 1960Q1-2007Q4 sample to pin
3See Smets and Wouters (2003), Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010), or Coenen, Straub, and Trabandt (2012)
for examples of DSGE models estimated by Bayesian methods on detrended data.
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Table 1. Selected prior and posterior distributions.
Parameter Prior distribution Mode [5%, 95%] of posterior distribution
Density Mean St.Dev. 1960-2007 1960-1978 1983-2007
Preferences
κ G 2.0 0.5 1.90 [1.23, 2.85] 1.82 [1.19, 2.77] 1.84 [1.16, 2.74]
h B 0.5 0.2 0.93 [0.91, 0.94] 0.90 [0.87, 0.93] 0.91 [0.90, 0.94]
Frictions
ψ B 0.6 0.15 0.05 [0.02, 0.11] 0.21 [0.10, 0.43] 0.14 [0.05, 0.24]
s G 6.0 1.0 8.23 [6.83, 10.10] 5.34 [4.19, 6.84] 7.67 [6.35, 9.80]
ξp B 0.5 0.15 0.91 [0.88, 0.93] 0.86 [0.81, 0.88] 0.90 [0.87, 0.93]
ξw B 0.5 0.15 0.95 [0.92, 0.98] 0.85 [0.78, 0.89] 0.90 [0.83, 0.95]
ιp B 0.5 0.15 0.09 [0.04, 0.19] 0.27 [0.18, 0.42] 0.19 [0.08, 0.42]
ιw B 0.5 0.15 0.60 [0.46, 0.78] 0.52 [0.36, 0.67] 0.38 [0.18, 0.58]
Fiscal policy
ρτ B 0.5 0.2 0.97 [0.94, 0.99] 0.85 [0.77, 0.95] 0.90 [0.87, 0.97]
γτ N 0.0 3.0 0.40 [−0.37, 0.56] 0.35 [−0.20, 0.67] 0.24 [−0.13, 1.53]
κτ N 0.0 3.0 0.29 [−1.25, 3.75] 0.09 [−0.38, 1.59] 0.15 [−1.34, 2.68]
ρg B 0.5 0.2 0.95 [0.94, 0.97] 0.90 [0.87, 0.95] 0.94 [0.92, 0.99]
−γg N 0.0 3.0 0.43 [0.19, 0.70] 0.10 [−0.30, 0.68] 0.17 [−0.16, 1.02]
κg N 0.0 3.0 1.12 [0.49, 1.86] 1.75 [0.77, 2.54] 1.24 [−0.14, 2.90]
ρz B 0.5 0.2 0.81 [0.76, 0.89] 0.75 [0.69, 0.88] 0.75 [0.67, 0.88]
−γz N 0.0 3.0 0.49 [0.14, 0.99] 1.96 [1.04, 3.21] 0.44 [0.00, 0.99]
−κz N 0.0 3.0 0.93 [0.00, 2.03] 2.66 [0.79, 4.86] 1.04 [−0.25, 2.47]
down steady-state fiscal ratios: the shares of government spending and transfers in output are
G/Y = 0.16 and Z/Y = 0.06, while the average tax rate is τ = 0.22.
The first columns in Tables 1 and 2 provide the prior distributions for estimated parame-
ters. The priors for standard New Keynesian parameters closely follow the quantitative DSGE
literature (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti, 2010). Reflecting
Traum and Yang’s (2011) findings, I assume that monetary policy is active at the prior mean:
the central bank raises the nominal interest rate by more than inflation to ensure price stability.
Turning to the debt and output feedback coefficients defining the fiscal rules, I adopt agnostic
normal priors with mean 0 and standard deviation 3 to let the data choose both the sign and
size of endogenous movements in the average tax rate, government spending, and transfers. All
autoregressive coefficients, both in policy rules and in exogenous processes, follow beta priors
with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.2.
3.2. Posterior estimates. The state-space representation of the linearized model allows to
evaluate the log-posterior function using the Kalman filter. For each estimation sample, I
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Table 2. Selected prior and posterior distributions.
Parameter Prior distribution Mode [5%-95%] of posterior distribution
Density Mean St.Dev. 1960-2007 1960-1978 1983-2007
Monetary policy
ρr B 0.5 0.2 0.87 [0.81, 0.93] 0.48 [0.39, 0.63] 0.90 [0.86, 0.92]
ηpi N 1.75 0.25 1.38 [1.02, 1.73] 1.50 [1.34, 1.66] 1.77 [1.60, 1.94]
ηy N 0.2 0.05 0.19 [0.08, 0.36] 0.32 [0.24, 0.43] 0.47 [0.30, 0.64]
Shock processes
ρb B 0.5 0.2 0.44 [0.31, 0.55] 0.34 [0.18, 0.46] 0.44 [0.28, 0.57]
ρa B 0.5 0.2 0.94 [0.92, 0.96] 0.95 [0.93, 0.96] 0.94 [0.91, 0.96]
ρi B 0.5 0.2 0.26 [0.16, 0.40] 0.23 [0.09, 0.41] 0.47 [0.32, 0.62]
ρp B 0.5 0.2 0.67 [0.54, 0.77] 0.43 [0.23, 0.63] 0.41 [0.11, 0.55]
ρw B 0.5 0.2 0.17 [0.07, 0.27] 0.11 [0.04, 0.25] 0.20 [0.08, 0.35]
ρm B 0.5 0.2 0.26 [0.14, 0.40] 0.98 [0.97, 0.99] 0.76 [0.60, 0.88]
σb IG 3.0 3.0 1.24 [0.86, 1.74] 1.35 [0.88, 1.91] 0.97 [0.63, 1.52]
σa IG 3.0 3.0 2.04 [1.89, 2.25] 2.48 [2.20, 2.88] 1.44 [1.30, 1.64]
σi IG 3.0 3.0 5.69 [4.49, 7.05] 4.44 [3.27, 5.83] 2.78 [2.11, 3.80]
σp IG 3.0 3.0 4.69 [3.60, 6.63] 4.85 [3.35, 7.53] 8.00 [6.10, 11.80]
σw IG 3.0 3.0 3.79 [3.26, 4.36] 3.05 [2.54, 3.58] 4.13 [3.35, 4.95]
σm IG 3.0 3.0 5.02 [4.65, 5.56] 6.38 [5.21, 7.47] 7.52 [6.68, 8.61]
στ IG 3.0 3.0 1.56 [1.43, 1.70] 1.66 [1.46, 1.91] 1.42 [1.27, 1.61]
σg IG 3.0 3.0 6.92 [6.41, 7.62] 7.95 [7.15, 9.47] 5.50 [4.96, 6.26]
σz IG 3.0 3.0 4.01 [3.72, 4.40] 4.64 [4.11, 5.39] 3.25 [2.95, 3.71]
maximize this function with respect to the estimated parameters and construct the posterior
distribution using the random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a single Markov chain
of one million draws, keeping the last 400, 000 draws for computations. For each chain, I
choose a step size ensuring an acceptance rate close to 30% and use standard diagnostic tests
to confirm convergence.
The last three columns in Tables 1 and 2 report the means and 90-percent intervals of the
posterior distributions for the three estimation samples. Most parameters are well-identified
from the data, with the exception of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The estimated degree
of consumption habits h is substantially above its prior mean. Estimated degrees of nominal
rigidities ξp and ξw are quite high, but introducing strategic complementarities among price
setters would mechanically lower them while leaving model dynamics unchanged (Smets and
Wouters, 2007).
Turning to policy parameters, there is considerable interest rate smoothing in the full sample,
and the central bank’s reaction to inflation has become stronger over time. The three fiscal
variables are also highly persistent, with autoregressive coefficients estimated close to or above
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Figure 1. Selected DSGE-estimated responses after a spending shock g.
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Notes. Solid line: average posterior response. Dashed lines: 90-percent posterior confidence interval. Full sample
estimates. The real interest rate is in annualized percentage.
0.80. The estimated policy rules provide significant statistical evidence in favor of endogenous
feedback movements in transfers and government spending, albeit not in the tax rate. Namely,
transfers respond negatively to both debt and output, reflecting a debt-stabilization motive and
the countercyclical character of its most important components like social security payments.
More importantly given the focus of the paper, all estimates of γg are negative and all estimates
of κg are positive, implying that government consumption responds negatively to the debt level
and positively to contemporaneous output over all samples. This last finding hints that the
relaxing of the government budget constraint induced by higher output dominates potential
automatic stabilization motives, consistent with Clemens and Miran’s (2012) findings for state-
level expenditures. Interestingly, the debt elasticity of government appears to increase slightly
over time, while the output elasticity instead falls.
Figure 1 illustrates the response of the economy to an exogenous spending shock gt , nor-
malized to raise government expenditures by one unit on impact. All predictions come from
the model parametrized with the full-sample estimate, but IRFs are qualitatively and quanti-
tatively similar in the two subsamples.4 In particular, the impact output multiplier is stable
4Output IRFs estimated from the two subsamples are reported in, e.g., Figure 2.
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Table 3. Model comparisons: Endogenous vs. exogenous government consumption.
Estimation sample Bayes factor relative to a model with exogenous government consumption
1960-2007 exp(8)
1960-1978 exp(8)
1983-2007 exp(2)
Notes. Bayes factors computed as p(Y T | M1)/p(Y T | M2), where Y T is observed data, M1 is the
baseline DSGE model, M2 is the restricted submodel verifying γg = κg = 0, and p(Y T | Mi) is
the marginal data density associated with model i. Log marginal data densities computed using the
modified harmonic mean estimator.
over time, equal to 0.83 in the full sample and to 0.80 in both subsamples. It is below one
because of the crowding out of private consumption and investment, which both fall on impact
and over time due to a negative wealth effect and to a persistent rise in the real interest rate
induced by the central bank’s response to the increase in inflation and output.
3.3. Endogenous movements in government consumption. The above estimates suggest
that the data support endogenous feedbacks on government consumption. As a more formal
measure of the strength of these effects, I use Bayes factors to evaluate the relative fit of the
estimated DSGE model compared to one in which exogenous government spending is imposed.
Table 3 reports the Bayes factor associated with each estimation sample. Since the restricted
model is the reference, a large statistic signals that the data favor the model with endogenous
reactions in government consumption. This is clearly the case in the full sample, for which
there is decisive statistical evidence in favor of government spending endogeneity. This is also
true for the 1960-1978 period. The statistic for the second subsample is somewhat weaker, but
still provides positive evidence in favor of the model with endogenous spending according to
Kass and Raftery’s (1995) interpretation of Bayes factors. This is an interesting result. Indeed,
the estimated coefficients γg and κg are not different from zero when considered individually.
Nevertheless, the Bayes factor shows that the null hypothesis of the joint nullity of γg and κg
is rejected. Therefore, there is significant statistical evidence that government consumption
features an endogenous component over all estimation samples. As I show in the next section,
the presence of such feedbacks has the potential to induce large bias in estimated output
multipliers.
Eventually, it is instructive to look at the respective contributions of the nine structural
shock to the forecast error of government consumption, as the fiscal rule implies that all distur-
bances will affect spending through endogenous effects. In the very short run, the bulk of the
forecast error of government consumption is due to the exogenous spending shock in spite of
the feedbacks. For instance, more than 97 percent of the one-step-ahead forecast error variance
of government consumption originate from g in all estimation samples. At longer horizons,
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other shocks come into play, most notably the monetary disturbance m and the tax shock τ .
The former affects government spending via its large effects on output in this sticky-price econ-
omy, while the second propagates to spending via its effect on public deficit and debt. Finally,
the contribution of the exogenous government consumption shock to aggregate fluctuations is
within the range typically reported in the literature, with a share in the forecast error variance
of output close to 3 percent after one quarter, to 2 percent at the one-year horizon, and to 1
percent asymptotically in all samples.
4. Effects of Endogeneity on Estimated Spending Multipliers
The above results suggest that mainstream econometric practices assuming exogenous gov-
ernment consumption may be at odds with the data. This raises the question of the effects of
omitting to control for endogeneity when identifying output multipliers in general equilibrium.
In this section, I use simple Monte Carlo experiments to quantify these effects and assess the
performances of three estimation approaches: a DSGE model with exogenous spending, a VAR
model identified with Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) exogeneity restriction, and a VAR iden-
tified with Mountford and Uhlig’s (2009) sign restrictions. The two first methods assume away
spending endogeneity, while the last one tries to control for it.
I design the experiments as follows. Taking the estimated DSGE model as data generating
process (DGP), I simulate 1,000 artificial time series and identify spending shocks and output
multipliers using the three approaches under test. I report results under three forms: output
IRFs corresponding to an exogenous spending shock increasing spending by 1 dollar on im-
pact, present-value multipliers at horizons 0 and 4, and average correlations between the true
spending shock in the DGP, gt , and that identified by the econometrician, denoted ̂
g
t . I define
present-value multipliers as
PVM(k) =
∑k
j=0R
−jdYt+j∑k
j=0R
−jdGt+j
,
where R is the steady-state gross nominal interest rate and dYt+j and dGt+j denote respec-
tively the responses of output and government consumption j periods after the impulse. Thus,
PVM(0) corresponds to a standard impact multiplier, while PVM(4) accounts for the full
dynamics of the economy one year after the shock.
I work with three parameterizations of the DGP, corresponding respectively to the point
estimates obtained for the 1960-2007, 1960-1978, and 1983-2007 periods. For each design, I
include as many observations as in the original sample used to estimate the DSGE model,
that is 192, 76, and 100 respectively. I always discard a burn-in period of 500 observations.
Full-sample experiments closely correspond to empirical papers abstracting from breaks, while
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Figure 2. Estimation of output IRFs: DSGE model with exogenous spending.
0 5 10 15
−1
0
1
DGP: 1960−2007
quarters
Output
0 5 10 15
−1
0
1
DGP: 1960−1978
quarters
Output
0 5 10 15
−1
0
1
DGP: 1983−2007
quarters
Output
Notes. Solid black line: IRF to the spending shock in the DGP (DSGE model with endogenous policy). Solid
red line: average IRF estimated using a DSGE model with exogenous policy. Dashed blue lines: empirical 90%
confidence interval.
subsample experiments allow for a sensitivity analysis given the changing patterns of spending
endogeneity over time. Figures 2-5 and Table 4 display the results.
From an econometric perspective, the experiments have an indirect inference flavor since
all tested models are misspecified (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault, 1993). Unlike indirect
inference however, this misspecification is not taken into account when computing multipli-
ers. Formally, the experiments thus quantify estimation errors arising with misspecified model
omitting endogenous feedback effects on government consumption.
4.1. DSGE model with exogenous spending. I first test the performance of a restricted
version of the DSGE model in which government consumption exogeneity is assumed. For
each artificial dataset, I reestimate the model imposing κg = γg = 0, using the same set of
observables as before and the same prior distributions as in Tables 1-2. I compute IRFs and
multipliers at the posterior mode.
The three panels in Figure 2 compare the average estimated output IRF with that implied
by the true DGP for the three parameterizations. Overall, the performance of the misspeci-
fied DSGE model seems satisfactory, as the true output response always lies within the tight
confidence bands around the average estimated IRF. This is true with all three DGPs, irrespec-
tive of whether they feature significant feedbacks from both debt and output on government
consumption (first panel, 1960-2007 DGP), a significant feedback from contemporaneous out-
put only (central panel, 1960-1978 DGP), or no independently significant feedback (last panel,
1983-2007 DGP). The statistics in Table 4 confirm that point estimates of multipliers are ac-
curately estimated, with bias of less than five percent on impact and less than ten percent at
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the one-year horizon. Also, sampling uncertainty is moderate, allowing to perform precise in-
ference on the size of true multipliers. Eventually, in all designs the identified spending shocks
are strongly linked with the true ones, with average correlations above 0.9.
One interesting outcome of the experiment is the fact that impact multipliers are slightly un-
derestimated with DGPs corresponding to the full 1960-2007 sample and to the first 1960-1978
subsample. Given the procyclical response of government consumption to contemporaneous
output, the analytical argument in Fe`ve, Matheron, and Sahuc (2013) would instead imply
that output multipliers should be overestimated when neglecting the endogenous component.
It is in fact the presence of the debt feedback, not considered by Fe`ve, Matheron, and Sahuc,
which explains this discrepancy. In the true DGP, a positive, exogenous innovation to govern-
ment consumption raises the debt-to-DGP ratio on impact, which will have a negative effect
on the future path of spending. Neglecting this feedback effect yields one to underestimate the
persistence of government consumption, which is key for the size of the economy’s response.
4.2. VARs identified with exogeneity restrictions. I now turn to VAR models identified
with the exogeneity restrictions pushed forward by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). I consider
the generic structural model
A
GtYt
Xt
 = B(L)
Gt−1Yt−1
Xt−1
+ ηt, (1)
where Gt and Yt denote government consumption and output, Xt is a vector of additional
observables, B(L) is a matrix polynomial of order p, and ηt is a vector of ‘structural’ shocks.
Variables are expressed as deviations from their steady state, so I omit the constant. I estimate
the reduced-form version of Eq. (1) on artificial data and identify the spending shock by
imposing that government consumption cannot react within a period to structural shocks other
than its own innovations. Formally, this amounts to imposing that the first row of A contains
a one in its first entry and zeros elsewhere.
In practice, I test several choices of Xt. The benchmark specification is the baseline 3-variable
system from Blanchard and Perotti (2002) that includes tax revenue as only additional observ-
able. Because the DGP features a debt feedback, I also study a 4-variable system including
both taxes and the debt-to-output ratio. Eventually, I test a larger system in which Xt in-
cludes, on top of taxes and debt, consumption, hours worked, the nominal interest rate, and
inflation. In all cases, I set p = 4 after checking that the results are not sensitive to further
increase in the lag length.
Figures 3 and 4 display the average output IRFs identified from the 3-variable and 4-variable
VARs. Results for the larger system are comparable to those for the 4-variable VAR, so I omit
them to save space. It is striking that in all designs, exogeneity restrictions overestimate
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Figure 3. Estimation of output IRFs: 3-variable VAR identified with exogene-
ity restrictions.
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Notes. Solid black line: IRF to the spending shock in the DGP. Solid red line: average IRF estimated using
a VAR identified via exogeneity restrictions. Dashed blue lines: empirical 66% confidence interval. The VAR
includes government spending, output, and tax revenue as observables.
the output response on impact. The resulting upward bias in output multipliers is quantita-
tively large, ranging from 20 percent when the DGP matches the properties of the 1983-2007
subsample to almost 110 percent when the DGP corresponds to the first subsample. Another
remarkable result is the change in the shape of estimated IRFs over time: in the first subperiod,
the average VAR-estimated output response to a government consumption shock is strongly
persistent and stays above zero for several years, whereas it quickly decays and falls below zero
after one year in the second subsample. Such patterns are in line with subsample VAR esti-
mates reported in the literature (see, e.g., Perotti, 2004), confirming that the DSGE model used
as DGP captures important properties of the data. However, the experiment emphasizes that
differences in endogeneity patterns rather than in the underlying theoretical output response
are responsible for these changing estimates.
To gain intuition on the sources of the identification problem, it is instructive to compare
the results across Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 3, the estimated VAR does not include debt
among observables. Since the lagged values of spending, output, and tax revenue provide an
incomplete signal for the budget balance because of the omission of transfers, it is impossible
for this VAR to correctly capture the debt feedback. On the other hand, the VAR estimated in
Figure 4 includes an observation of debt and solves this omitted variable problem, but it still
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Figure 4. Estimation of output IRFs: 4-variable VAR identified with exogene-
ity restrictions.
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Notes. Solid black line: IRF to the spending shock in the DGP. Solid red line: average IRF estimated using
a VAR identified via exogeneity restrictions. Dashed blue lines: empirical 68% confidence interval. The VAR
includes government spending, output, tax revenue, and the debt-to-GDP ratio as observables.
yields severely biased output IRFs and spending multipliers. The only effect of incorporating
debt in the system is to lower the persistence of the estimated output response, but it does not
improve estimates of the impact multiplier. The econometric issue therefore lies in the inability
of exogeneity restrictions to identify the true spending shock in presence of a contemporaneous
output feedback. As discussed in Fe`ve, Matheron, and Sahuc (2013), the underlying intuition is
straightforward. On the one hand, exogeneity restrictions implicitly attribute all the conditional
correlation between output and government consumption to the multiplier. On the other, the
presence of a fiscal rule means that part of this correlation reflects endogenous mechanisms.
The combination of these two arguments implies that exogeneity restrictions will overestimate
the output multiplier in presence of a procyclical government spending rule.
Another important property uncovered by the experiments is the large amount of sampling
uncertainty in output IRFs and multipliers derived from the VARs. The confidence bands
displayed in Figures 3 and 4 have a 68-percent coverage, yet they are much larger than the
90-percent confidence bands for DSGE-based estimates shown in Figure 2.5 As can be seen
from Table 4, the empirical standard deviations for estimated multipliers are also often more
than ten times larger with VARs than with DSGE models. At one level, this pattern is not
5I have chosen to display 68-percent confidence bands for VAR experiments to avoid overloading the figures.
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Table 4. Estimation of Present-Value Multipliers on Artificial Data.
Data Generating Process
1960-2013 1960-1978 1983-2007
Theoretical multipliers in the DGP
PVM(0) 0.833 0.803 0.803
PVM(4) 0.627 0.600 0.553
DSGE model with exogenous government spending
PVM(0) 0.794 (0.017) 0.780 (0.020) 0.834 (0.022)
PVM(4) 0.556 (0.032) 0.564 (0.038) 0.608 (0.040)
corr(g, ̂g) 0.947 (0.020) 0.903 (0.035) 0.955 (0.020)
VAR identified with exogeneity restrictions (3-variable system)
PVM(0) 1.077 (0.377) 1.653 (0.511) 0.972 (0.562)
PVM(4) 0.839 (0.582) 1.596 (0.852) 0.597 (1.111)
corr(g, ̂g) 0.944 (0.017) 0.899 (0.032) 0.910 (0.030)
VAR identified with sign restrictions
PVM(0) 1.724 (1.179) 2.356 (1.206) 1.910 (1.681)
PVM(4) 1.605 (1.334) 2.295 (1.155) 1.910 (1.598)
corr(g, ̂g) 0.220 (0.051) 0.200 (0.050) 0.237 (0.053)
Notes. Estimated multipliers are sample averages over the replica-
tions. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
surprising, as even the 3-variable VAR has more coefficients that the DSGE model. However, it
clearly calls into question the robustness of multipliers estimated from short subsamples using
VARs, such as those discussed in Perotti (2004) or Bouakez, Chihi, and Normandin (2014).
To sum up, the experiments thus suggest that multipliers derived from VARs identified via
exogeneity restrictions are less robust than their DSGE counterparts: they are more severely
affected by the presence of an endogenous component in government spending and are much
more volatile.
4.3. VARs identified with sign restrictions. The last econometric model I test is a VAR
identified with sign restrictions. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) push forward this approach
because of its apparent ability to filter out automatic movements in fiscal variables over the
business cycle. It is thus of particular interest to check its empirical performance against DGPs
estimated from the data and allowing for endogenous shifts in fiscal policy.
Practically, I start from the structural VAR (1), in which Xt includes tax revenue, the debt-
to-output ratio, consumption, hours worked, the nominal interest rate, and inflation. Using a
large number of observables is helpful to strengthen identification via sign restrictions. I identify
only two disturbances: a business cycle shock, defined as a shock that jointly moves output, tax
revenue, consumption, and hours worked for four periods, and a government spending shock,
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Figure 5. Estimation of output IRFs: VAR identified with sign restrictions.
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Notes. Solid black line: IRF to the spending shock in the DGP. Solid red line: average IRF estimated using a
VAR identified by sign restrictions. Dashed blue lines: empirical 68% confidence interval.
defined as a shock orthogonal to the business cycle shock and that increases spending for four
periods.6 I perform identification using Uhlig’s (2005) ‘pure-sign-restriction’ approach: for each
artificial dataset, I search for factorizations of the residual covariance matrix that verify the
sign restrictions using random draws, keeping 200 valid candidates per dataset. The output
IRF for this particular realization of the DGP is then the average response over the candidates.
Results are plotted in Figure 5. Remarkably, average output IRFs identified by sign restric-
tions are more biased that those obtained by exogeneity restrictions, even though the very
objective of sign restrictions is to control for feedback effects. The impact response of output
to the government consumption shock is largely overestimated in all designs, and this is also
true of estimated multipliers. On impact, upward bias in multipliers range from 100 to 200
percent, and can reach up to 300 percent at the one-year horizon. Another sign of the poor
performance of sign restrictions is provided by the correlations between the VAR-identified
spending shocks and the true government consumption disturbances, which are much lower
than with the two other econometric approaches. Eventually, sampling uncertainty is large
and estimation outcomes are very noisy.
6For computational reasons, I do not identify a monetary shock. Both Caldara and Kamps (2012) and
preliminary work for this paper confirm that this omission has little effect on the outcome of the sign-restriction
approach.
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Because the estimated VAR includes the debt-to-output ratio, the debt feedback plays no
important role here. Again, the issue lies with inability of sign restrictions to deal with the
output feedback. The experiments thus provide little support for the claim that multipliers
identified by sign restrictions are more robust to endogenous movements in fiscal variables.
This is a deceptive finding, especially given the computational cost of practically implementing
the sign restrictions.
5. Conclusion
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, I use an estimated DSGE model with endoge-
nous fiscal policy to quantify the feedback effects affecting government consumption in the U.S.
economy. I find significant statistical evidence in favor of such endogenous patterns over both
a long sample and two subperiods, even though the strength of the feedbacks has somewhat
decreased over time. Second, I use the estimated model as laboratory to test spending mul-
tipliers derived from a DSGE model with exogenous policy, VARs identified with exogeneity
restrictions, and VARs identified with sign restrictions. The experiments suggest that mul-
tipliers are quite accurately estimated by DSGE models but may be severely overestimated
and noisy when derived from SVARs. Importantly, I find that sign restrictions perform worse
that simpler exogeneity restrictions, even though they are supposed to deal with endogenous
movements in fiscal policy.
My results suggest some interesting research avenues for future work. First, it would be
important to provide some microfoundation for the feedback policy effects and Clemens and
Miran’s (2012) analysis of the role of balanced-budget rules for local governments provides
an interesting starting point. Second, it would be instructive to disaggregate government
consumption into federal and local components, or into different types of expenditures, to refine
the empirical analysis of the feedbacks. Eventually, the methodology implemented in this paper
provides a natural tool to evaluate tax output multipliers, whose identification certainly suffers
from similar endogeneity issues.
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Appendix A. Robustness
This appendix discusses the robustness of the estimation results from section 3 to the spec-
ification of fiscal and monetary policy rules.
First, I generalize the government spending policy rule to
Ĝt = ρg1Ĝt−1 + ρg2Ĝt−2 + (1− ρg1 − ρg2)(γg ŝt−1 + κg1Ŷt + κg2Ŷt−1) + gt . (F1)
Compared to the benchmark, this specification allows for richer dynamics thanks to the AR(2)
structure and incorporates feedbacks from both contemporaneous and lagged output. Under
parameter restrictions, it also collapses to an AR(1) rule specified in terms of the spending-
to-output ratio. Second, motivated by Leeper, Traum, and Walker’s (2015) contention that
monetary policy plays a key role in shaping the size of output multipliers, I consider alternative
rules for the nominal interest rate:
R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ηpipit + ηy(Ŷt − Ŷt−1)] + mt , (M1)
R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)[ηpipit + ηy(Ŷt − Ŷ ?t )] + mt , (M2)
R̂t = ρrR̂t−1 + (1− ρr)(r̂?t + ηpipit) + mt . (M3)
Rule (M1) assumes that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate in reaction to output
growth rather than output. According to rule (M2), the nominal interest rate responds instead
to the output gap, with Y ?t representing the efficient output level in an economy without
nominal rigidity. Eventually, rule (M3) follows Cu´rdia, Ferrero, Ng, and Tambalotti (2015)
by assuming that the monetary authority tracks the efficient real interest rate r?t that would
obtain in an economy without nominal friction.
Figure 6 reports the output responses to an exogenous government consumption shock that
obtain when estimating each of the above specifications from the full 1960-2007 sample. To ease
comparison, I also report the baseline output IRF estimated from the benchmark model. Rules
(F1), (M1), or (M2) yield impact output multipliers very close to the baseline specification,
but the economy’s response to the spending shock is slightly more persistent using rules (F1)
and (M1). On the other hand, rule (M3) is associated with a smaller impact multiplier and a
shorter-lived positive output response. Yet, it is also the least preferred specification for the
monetary policy rule according to Bayes factors.
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Figure 6. DSGE-estimated output responses after a spending shock: Robustness.
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Notes. Solid line: average posterior responses. Full-sample estimates.
Eventually, I emphasize that rules (F1), (M1), (M2), and (M3) are all associated with higher
degrees of government spending endogeneity compared to the benchmark choice.7 Specifically,
the baseline specification is associated with the smallest point estimates of the debt and output
elasticity of government consumption. Given that this contemporaneous feedback is at the
heart of the identification issues studied in section 4, the paper’s results may be viewed as
conservative with respect to the design of policy rules.
Appendix B. Data Construction
This appendix describes sources and data construction for the nine time series used for
estimation. I convert nominal series to real values by dividing them by the implicit deflator
for personal consumption expenditures (NIPA Table 1.1.4, line 2). Real series are expressed in
per-capita terms using the civilian non-institutional population over 16 (BLS, LNU00000000Q).
Consumption. Private consumption, Ct, is defined as consumption expenditures on non-
durable goods and services (BEA, NIPA table 1.1.5, lines 5 and 6).
Investment. Gross investment, It, is defined as the sum of consumption expenditures on
durable goods (BEA, NIPA table 1.1.5, line 4), gross private domestic investment (BEA, NIPA
table 1.1.5, line 7), and gross government investment (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 36).
Government spending. Government spending, Gt, is defined as government consumption
expenditures (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 18).
7Detailed estimation results for all specifications are available upon request.
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Tax revenue. Tax revenue, Tt, is defined as the sum of personal current taxes (BEA, NIPA
table 3.1, line 3), half of taxes on production and imports (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 4),
taxes on corporate income (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 5), and contributions for government
social insurance (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 7). I do not fully include taxes on production and
imports because they partly include excise taxes akin to a distortionary tax on consumption.
NIPA table 3.5 suggests that a half-half representation provides a good approximation to the
distribution.
Transfers. I define transfers, Zt, as the residual in the government budget constraint to
ensure that the model-based debt variable matches its empirical counterpart. Therefore, trans-
fers are defined as the sum of net transfer payments, net capital transfer payments, subsidies
(BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 27), and other government expenditures, minus half of taxes on
production and imports, taxes from the rest of the world (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 6), income
receipts on assets (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 8), and current surplus of government enterprises
(BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 16). Net transfer payments are defined as current transfer pay-
ments (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 19) minus current transfer receipts (BEA, NIPA table 3.1,
line 13), while net capital transfer payments are defined as capital transfer payments (BEA,
NIPA table 3.1, line 37) minus capital transfer receipts (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 33). Other
government expenditures are defined as the sum of gross government investment (BEA, NIPA
table 3.1, line 36) and government purchases of nonproduced assets (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line
38), minus government consumption of fixed capital (BEA, NIPA table 3.1, line 39).
Hours worked. Hours worked, Lt, are defined asHt×Nt, whereHt denotes average nonfarm
business weekly hours duration (BLS, PRS85006023) andNt denotes civilian employment (BLS,
CE16OV).
Wage rate. The wage rate, Wt, is defined as the index for hourly compensation in the
nonfarm business sector (BLS, PRS85006103).
Inflation. The gross inflation rate, pit, is defined as the growth rate of the implicit deflator
for personal consumption expenditures (BEA, NIPA table 1.1.4, line 2).
Nominal interest rate. The nominal interest rate, Rt, is constructed from the quarterly
average of the effective federal funds rate (FRED database).
